Types of Research
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Many low- and middle-income countries remain challenged by a financial infrastructure gap, evidenced by very low numbers of bank branches and automated teller machines (ATMs) (e.g., 2.9 branches per 100,000 people in Ethiopia versus 13.5 in India and 32.9 in the United States (U.S.) and 0.5 ATMs per 100,000 people in Ethiopia versus 19.7 in India and 173 in the U.S.) (The World Bank 2015a; 2015b). Furthermore, only an estimated 62 percent of adults globally have a banking account through a formal financial institution, leaving over 2 billion adults unbanked (Demirgüç–Kunt et al., 2015). While conventional banks have struggled to extend their networks into low-income and rural communities, digital financial services (DFS) have the potential to extend financial opportunities to these groups (Radcliffe & Voorhies, 2012). In order to utilize DFS however, users must convert physical cash to electronic money which requires access to cash-in, cash-out (CICO) networks—physical access points including bank branches but also including “branchless banking" access points such as ATMs, point-of-sale (POS) terminals, agents, and cash merchants. As mobile money and branchless banking expand, countries are developing new regulations to govern their operations (Lyman, Ivatury, & Staschen, 2006; Lyman, Pickens, & Porteous, 2008; Ivatury & Mas, 2008), including regulations targeting aspects of the different CICO interfaces.
EPAR's work on CICO networks consists of five components. First, we summarize types of recent mobile money and branchless banking regulations related to CICO networks and review available evidence on the impacts these regulations may have on markets and consumers. In addition to this technical report we developed a short addendum (EPAR 355a) which includes a description of findings on patterns around CICO regulations over time. Another addendum (EPAR 355b) summarizes trends in exclusivity regulations including overall trends, country-specific approaches to exclusivity, and a table showing how available data on DFS adoption from FII and GSMA might relate to changes in exclusivity policies over time. A third addendum (EPAR 355c) explores trends in CICO network expansion with a focus on policies seeking to improve access among more remote or under-served populations. Lastly, we developed a database of CICO regulations, including a regulatory decision options table which outlines the key decisions that countries can make to regulate CICOs and a timeline of when specific regulations related to CICOs were introduced in eight focus countries, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Tanzania, and Uganda.
Donor countries and multilateral organizations may pursue multiple goals with foreign aid, including supporting low-income country development for strategic/security purposes (national security, regional political stability) and for short-and long-term economic interests (market development and access, local and regional market stability). While the literature on the effectiveness of aid in supporting progress on different indicators of country development is inconclusive, donors are interested in evidence that aid funding is not permanent but rather contributes to a process by which recipient countries develop to a point that they are economically self-sufficient. In this report, we review the literature on measures of country self-sufficiency and descriptive evidence from illustrative case studies to explore conditions associated with transitions toward self-sufficiency in certain contexts.
Common aid allocation formulas incorporate measures of income per capita but not measures of poverty, likely based on the assumption that rising average incomes are associated with reduced poverty. If declining poverty is the outcome of interest, however, the case of Nigeria illustrates that such aid allocation formulas could lead to poorly targeted or inefficient aid disbursements. Using data from the World Bank and the Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics, we find that while the relationship between economic growth and poverty in Nigeria varies depending on the time period studied, overall from 1992-2009 Nigeria’s poverty rate has only declined by 6% despite a 70% increase in per capita gross domestic product (GDP). A review of the literature indicates that income inequality, the prominence of the oil sector, unemployment, corruption, and poor education and health in Nigeria may help to explain the pattern of high ongoing poverty rates in the country even in the presence of economic growth. Our analysis is limited by substantial gaps in the availability of quality data on measures of poverty and economic growth in Nigeria, an issue also raised in the literature we reviewed, but our findings support arguments that economic growth should not be assumed to lead to poverty reduction and that the relationship between these outcomes likely depends on contextual factors.
This research brief provides an overview of the banana and plantain value chains in West Africa. Because of the greater production and consumption of plantains than bananas in the region, the brief focuses on plantains and concentrates on the major plantain-producing countries of Ghana, Cameroon, and Nigeria. The brief is divided into the following sections: Key Statistics (trends in banana and plantain production, consumption, and trade since 1990), Production, Post-Harvest Practices and Challenges, Marketing Systems, and Importance (including household consumption and nutrition). West Africa is one of the major plantain-producing regions of the world, accounting for approximately 32% of worldwide production. Plantains are an important staple crop in the region with a high nutritional content, variety of preparation methods, and a production cycle that is less labor-intensive than many other crops. In addition to plantains, bananas are also grown in West Africa, but they account for only 2.3% of worldwide production. Bananas are more likely than plantains to be grown for export rather than local consumption. Major constraints to banana and plantain production include pests and disease, short shelf life, and damage during transportation.
This report provides a general overview of the markets for yams in Nigeria. The first section describes trends in yam production and consumption and international trade since 1990. The second section summarizes the varieties grown in Nigeria and their uses, followed by a discussion of the importance of yams as a source of nutrition and household income. The final section provides details about the production and marketing systems for yams in Nigeria, including environmental and gender considerations. Nigeria is the world’s largest yam producer in terms of quantity. Yam production and consumption have increased over the past twenty years, though more recently, production has been somewhat in decline and yields have been stagnant. The Nigerian government has played a more active role in improving agricultural production and export of root and tuber crops including yams in recent years, but so far with limited success. Yam producers and traders report diverse constraints to their full participation in the market, including high cost of inputs, planting materials and labor, lack of credit, limited access to proper, secure storage facilities, and high transportation costs.
This report provides a general overview of the market for yams in Ghana. We begin by describing historical trends in yam production and consumption since 1996, recent international trade, and prices. The second section summarizes the varieties grown in Ghana and their uses. The next several sections review available information about the production and marketing systems, followed by a discussion of the importance of yams as a source of nutrition and household income. The limited information available on sweet potato production in Ghana is presented in the appendix. We find that yam production in Ghana has increased steadily over the last 15 years, and that while yam yields have increased from 12.8 MT/Ha in 1996 to 15.6 MT/Ha in 2011, an estimated yield gap of 33.4 MT/Ha persists. Yam export levels have varied over the past 15 years, but show a generally positive trend. Most yam farmers are male smallholders with low levels of education, while most retailers, wholesalers and cross-border traders are women.
Cassava is a tuber crop originating in South America and grown in tropical and subtropical areas throughout the world. Cassava use varies significantly by region. In Africa, cassava is primarily grown for food. In Asia, production is typically for industrial purposes, including ethanol, while in Latin America and the Caribbean it is commonly used in animal feed. Both roots and leaves are consumed, though most information on production focuses on roots. There are bitter and sweet varieties; bitter cassava has a high cyanide content and must be processed prior to consumption, while sweet varieties can be eaten directly. This report presents information about current production, constraints, and future potential of cassava. We discuss cassava’s importance in Africa, current worldwide production, projections for supply and demand, production constraints, and current policies affecting cassava production and trade. We include global information but focus on Africa, particularly Nigeria, Ghana, Uganda, and Tanzania.
In the decades following independence in 1960, Côte d’Ivoire stood out as a shining example of economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. GDP increased at an annual average of 8.1 percent from 1960 to 1979, led largely by cocoa and coffee exports. Low export earnings from a fall in world cocoa prices and a heavy public debt burden halted this growth in the 1980s, followed by civil conflict beginning in 1999. Three decades of focus on export crops rather than food crops also left Côte d’Ivoire with a growing food deficit. This literature review examines the state of agriculture in Côte d’Ivoire and the history of government involvement in the agricultural sector. We find that while the country is poised to reemerge from a decade of economic stagnation and civil war after signing the Ouagadougou Political Accord in 2007, the political economy of Côte d’Ivoire is still heavily dependent upon and influenced by the production of cocoa. Cocoa is the top export, and cocoa export taxes provide one of the largest sources of revenue for the Government of Côte d’Ivoire (GoCI). Cocoa is not heavily dependent on fertilizer inputs and growers have increased production by expanding cropland. The small contribution of fertilizer to the production of this essential crop may help explain the GoCI’s low priority on expanding fertilizer production and use. Given that a large part of government revenue comes from the export of cocoa and coffee, the government has chosen to focus resources on crops that increase revenue. Even with the food riots in 2008, the GoCI has not made increasing domestic food production an important focus of agricultural policy.
Agriculture is the most important sector in the Ghanaian economy. In 2008, it accounted for over 32 percent of GDP and employed over half of the labor force. Economic development in Ghana has historically been dependent on the success of agriculture, particularly the main export crop, cocoa. Despite the sector’s importance, Ghanaian farmers have one of the lowest fertilizer application rates in Sub-Saharan Africa. The combination of a dominant agricultural sector, nutrient-poor soils, low fertilizer use among smallholder farmers, and the absence of locally produced inorganic fertilizers has prompted the government of Ghana (GoG) to intervene in the fertilizer market. This literature review examines the state of agriculture in Ghana, the history of the fertilizer market, and the current market structure. We find that the GoG has been a major actor in the inorganic fertilizer market over the past 50 years, from exercising total control of the domestic supply chain in the 1960s and 1970s to more indirect interventions in later years. In recent years, agricultural growth has averaged 5.5 percent as compared to 5.2 percent growth in the rest of the economy. However, most of this growth has been due to land expansion and favorable weather conditions rather than increased productivity. Increased fertilizer use among smallholder farmers has the potential to contribute to future agricultural growth and continued economic success.
In Mozambique, the legacies of colonial rule, socialism and civil war continue to constrain economic growth and agricultural production. Eighty percent of Mozambique’s labor force derives its livelihood from agriculture, but the nation remains a net food importer. The majority of all farmland is cultivated by smallholders whose fertilizer usage and crop yields are among the lowest in Africa. While Mozambique has experienced reasonable economic growth since the end of its civil war in 1992, it remains poor by almost any measure. In this literature review, we examine the state of agriculture in Mozambique, the country’s political history and post-war recovery, and the current fertilizer market. We find evidence that smallholder access to fertilizer in Mozambique is limited by lack of information, affordability, access to credit, a poor business environment, and limited infrastructure. The data demonstrate that increased investment in infrastructure is an important step to improve input and output market access for smallholders. The main government intervention currently impacting smallholder fertilizer use is the Agricultural Sector Public Expenditure Program (PROAGRI) initiative, however, more data is necessary to assess the impact of its policies and programs.