Types of Research
- (-) Remove Political Economy & Governance filter Political Economy & Governance
- (-) Remove Information & Mobile Technology filter Information & Mobile Technology
- (-) Remove 2018 filter 2018
- (-) Remove Sub-Saharan Africa filter Sub-Saharan Africa
- (-) Remove South Asia Region and Selected Countries filter South Asia Region and Selected Countries
- (-) Remove 2009 filter 2009
Many low- and middle-income countries remain challenged by a financial infrastructure gap, evidenced by very low numbers of bank branches and automated teller machines (ATMs) (e.g., 2.9 branches per 100,000 people in Ethiopia versus 13.5 in India and 32.9 in the United States (U.S.) and 0.5 ATMs per 100,000 people in Ethiopia versus 19.7 in India and 173 in the U.S.) (The World Bank 2015a; 2015b). Furthermore, only an estimated 62 percent of adults globally have a banking account through a formal financial institution, leaving over 2 billion adults unbanked (Demirgüç–Kunt et al., 2015). While conventional banks have struggled to extend their networks into low-income and rural communities, digital financial services (DFS) have the potential to extend financial opportunities to these groups (Radcliffe & Voorhies, 2012). In order to utilize DFS however, users must convert physical cash to electronic money which requires access to cash-in, cash-out (CICO) networks—physical access points including bank branches but also including “branchless banking" access points such as ATMs, point-of-sale (POS) terminals, agents, and cash merchants. As mobile money and branchless banking expand, countries are developing new regulations to govern their operations (Lyman, Ivatury, & Staschen, 2006; Lyman, Pickens, & Porteous, 2008; Ivatury & Mas, 2008), including regulations targeting aspects of the different CICO interfaces.
EPAR's work on CICO networks consists of five components. First, we summarize types of recent mobile money and branchless banking regulations related to CICO networks and review available evidence on the impacts these regulations may have on markets and consumers. In addition to this technical report we developed a short addendum (EPAR 355a) which includes a description of findings on patterns around CICO regulations over time. Another addendum (EPAR 355b) summarizes trends in exclusivity regulations including overall trends, country-specific approaches to exclusivity, and a table showing how available data on DFS adoption from FII and GSMA might relate to changes in exclusivity policies over time. A third addendum (EPAR 355c) explores trends in CICO network expansion with a focus on policies seeking to improve access among more remote or under-served populations. Lastly, we developed a database of CICO regulations, including a regulatory decision options table which outlines the key decisions that countries can make to regulate CICOs and a timeline of when specific regulations related to CICOs were introduced in eight focus countries, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Tanzania, and Uganda.
EPAR’s Political Economy of Fertilizer Policy series provides a history of government intervention in the fertilizer markets of eight Sub-Saharan African countries: Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tanzania. The briefs focus on details of present and past voucher programs, input subsidies, tariffs in the fertilizer sector, and the political context of these policies. The briefs illustrate these policies’ effect on key domestic crops and focus on the strengths and weaknesses of current market structure. Fertilizer policy in SSA has been extremely dynamic over the last fifty years, swinging from enormous levels of intervention in the 1960s and 70s to liberalization of markets of the 1980s and 1990s. More recently, intervention has become more moderate, focusing on “market smart” subsidies and support. This executive summary highlights key findings and common themes from the series.